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1 Introduction
The impact of labor market reforms on unemployment and economic growth has been the
focus of a large theoretical and empirical literature. From an analytical perspective, im-
portant issues in that context are the modeling of the production structure and the causes
of mismatches between supply and demand in the labor market. Accounting for innovation
activities for instance is critical to study the role of human capital accumulation, knowledge
externalities, and the distribution of skills as sources of growth and employment; and mod-
eling labor market rigidities is essential to explain unemployment. The dominant literature
on labor market rigidities in recent years has been based on the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides search framework (see, for example, Zagler (2009) and Cacciatore and Fiori
(2016)). While search frictions have contributed to much better policy management of
cyclical unemployment in the short-run, it is technically not a structural institutional is-
sue. Structural rigidities can be referred to government legislation on minimum wages,
mandated firing costs, unemployment benefits, collective bargaining, and Shapiro-Stiglitz
style eﬃciency wages. A large number of studies focusing on one or two of these rigidities
have been made in recent years, which include Varga et al. (2014), Bhattacharyya and
Gupta (2015) and Chang and Hung (2016) on the collective bargaining front, and Bucci et
al. (2003), Meckl (2004), Parello (2011), and Zagler (2011) on the eﬃciency wage front.1 A
key result from the literature is that the relationship between growth and unemployment
may be weak, both on impact and in the long run.
However, the existing theoretical literature suﬀers from three major shortcomings. First,
except for a few contributions–such as Cacciatore and Fiori (2016), albeit in a business
cycle setting–most of the literature neglects dynamic trade-oﬀs that may be associated
with labor market reforms, that is, the possibility of conflicting eﬀects in the short and the
longer run in terms of their impact on either unemployment or growth. Second, almost
none of the existing models considers the supply side of the labor market. In particular, the
distribution of the labor force across levels of education, and how it changes over time, are
seldom explicitly analyzed.2 This creates a major diﬃculty in terms of understanding how
1Some of these contributions also account for the existence of an innovation sector, albeit (as discussed
next) in a partial manner.
2Some models introduce a work-leisure trade-oﬀ into workers’ utility functions (thereby accounting for
the intensive margin of labor supply), but the labor force distribution across skills (the extensive margin) is
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the labor market adjusts in response to shocks, how it interacts with the process of economic
growth, and how public policy can aﬀect unemployment and its composition. Third, only a
few contributions (including again Cacciatore and Fiori (2016)) study the impact of labor
market reforms on welfare and the possibility that growth and welfare eﬀects may move in
opposite directions. Doing so is important because it may help to understand resistance
to reform. Finally, there have been few attempts to assess quantitatively–in terms of
unemployment, growth, or welfare–the benefits of a simultaneous implementation of labor
market reforms, compared to a piecemeal approach, and the scope for exploiting policy
externalities to mitigate the welfare cost of reforms. This matters because the impact of a
specific policy may depend on whether other policies are implemented at the same time.
Ignoring policy externalities is a potential source of bias.
The purpose of this paper is to address all of these issues, using an overlapping gener-
ations (OLG) endogenous growth model with a heterogeneous labor force, final good and
innovation sectors, labor market rigidities, and structural unemployment. To model wage
formation in final good production, where activity involves more routine tasks and eﬀort is
fully observable, trade unions are introduced; but to model wage formation in the innova-
tion sector, an eﬃciency wage specification is adopted. This approach, as argued elsewhere
in the literature, is better suited than standard search models of the Mortensen-Pissarides
type to understand the link between wages and productivity in innovation activities over
the long-run, notably in a developing economy context. Indeed, in these activities, firms
cannot monitor researchers’ eﬀort perfectly; the key issue for an employer is thus to mit-
igate incentives to shirk and to encourage creativity. A natural approach is thus to use
an eﬃciency wage framework, in this case linking eﬀort and wages. As a result, persistent
uncompetitive wage diﬀerentials for highly-skilled workers may emerge across sectors.
While we are able to solve for the balanced growth path, the complexity of our model
precludes a full analytical characterization of its dynamic properties. We therefore calibrate
it to perform an extensive range of quantitative simulations for a group of middle-income
Latin American countries that are characterized by a range of labor market rigidities (in-
cluding high minimum wages and active trade unions), and have recorded high structural
unemployment rates in recent years. Indeed, long-term structural unemployment has been
kept constant. Other contributions do introduce disembodied human capital in the Uzawa-Lucas tradition,
but these studies also fail to account for the heterogeneous distribution of skills in the labor force.
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a long standing issue in many economies in Latin America. While the average headline
unemployment rate for the five main upper-middle income economies (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Peru) in recent years has receded from a high of 133 percent in 2000
to about 108 percent in 2017, structural unemployment remains a key policy concern–
despite decades of eﬀorts to promote ambitious labor market reforms in the region. At the
end of 2017, 26.4 million people were unemployed in Latin America and the Caribbean as
a whole, some 2 million more than just the year before (International Labour Organization
(2017)).3
We assess the impact of labor market reforms not only on unemployment, growth, and
welfare, but also on the misallocation of talent, a situation where individuals with abilities
that are high enough to operate in the innovation sector end up instead performing routine
production tasks. In an innovation-driven economy this is costly for society as a whole,
even though these individuals are (like everybody else) utility maximizers.
In addition to evaluating the eﬀects of single policy experiments, we consider composite
programs and examine to what extent policy externalities mitigate the adverse eﬀects
of individual reforms. We also consider the cases where composite reform programs are
combined with skills expansion, as well as an increase in public investment in infrastructure.
Such investments have been advocated in the aftermath of the global financial crisis–not
only as a short-term Keynesian response because of their demand-side eﬀects, but also as
a fundamental step to improve productivity because of their supply-side eﬀects (see for
instance LSE Growth Commission (2013) and International Monetary Fund (2016)).
To preview our results, we find that labor market reforms entail a two-way causality
between growth and unemployment: growth tends to lower unemployment, through its im-
pact on labor demand; but unemployment may lower growth because it reduces (through
its wage signalling eﬀects) incentives to acquire skills and constrains the ability to expand
innovation activities–a key engine of growth. Individual labor market reforms may gen-
erate a weak correlation between growth and unemployment, as predicted in a number of
existing studies; in addition, they may have conflicting eﬀects on growth and welfare in the
long run. To some extent, this trade-oﬀ can be tempered by exploiting policy externali-
3The only other region where unemployment rates are higher is the Middle East and North Africa,
where religious and cultural factors play a significant role. In other developing regions open unemployment
rates are low, either because employment rates are high (Asia and the Pacific) or because unemployment
is mostly disguised (Sub-Saharan Africa).
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ties. But to avoid creating an oversupply of specialized workers, governments must refrain
from adopting policies such as drastic reductions in eﬀective tuition fees, which would
only contribute to an absorption problem and potentially large numbers of unemployment
graduates.
In addition, public investment in infrastructure may help to boost employment and
mitigate the oversupply problem, partly by promoting innovation activities. Finally, a
comparison of the sum of the long-run eﬀects in terms of growth, unemployment and wel-
fare of each individual policy in a composite program with those associated with the same
composite program suggests that, if unemployment or social welfare matters more than
growth to policymakers, comprehensive reform programs may generate negative external-
ities. With limited political capital, overly ambitious labor market reform programs may
therefore be costly and ineﬀective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 defines the balanced growth equilibrium and Section 4 characterizes its properties.
Section 5 describes the calibration of the model for Latin America. Section 6 considers a
variety of individual labor market policies (including a reduction in the minimum wage and
a reduction in unemployment benefit rates), as well as a policy aimed at promoting the
acquisition of skills. Section 7 considers composite reform programs involving a combination
of these policies, with and without increases in public investment on infrastructure.4 The
final section provides some concluding remarks.5
2 The Model
The economy that we consider is populated by individuals with diﬀerent innate abilities,
who live for two periods, adulthood and old age. Population is constant at ¯ . Each
individual is endowed with one unit of time in each period of life. In old age, time is
allocated entirely to leisure. There are four production sectors: a manufacturing sector,
which produces a homogeneous final good with routine tasks, an intermediate goods sector,
an innovation sector, which creates designs used for producing intermediate goods, and an
4Appendix C provides a sensivitity analysis with respect to all experiments. The results are quantita-
tively and qualitatively robust to a significant range of parameter changes.
5In the working paper version of this article, we also perform all of these experiments with a group of
high-income European countries and provide a systematic comparison of the results.
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education sector, which allows individuals to acquire advanced training. The final good
is produced by combining both private and public inputs, and is used for consumption,
private and public investment, and the production of intermediate goods. The public input
consists of infrastructure and is provided free of direct charges. However, it is subject to
congestion. Production in the innovation sector combines public and private inputs as well,
but workers’ eﬀort is not observable.
Firms in the final good and innovation sectors are perfectly competitive whereas those
in the intermediate good sector are monopolistically competitive, producing (as in Romer
(1990)) diﬀerentiated varieties of goods. The total number of blueprints existing at a
certain point in time coincides with the number of intermediate input varieties available,
and represents the stock of (nonrival) knowledge.
Two categories of labor are available, untrained (with only basic education) and spe-
cialized (with advanced education). Workers are born untrained and must decide at the
beginning of adulthood whether or not to become specialized. Acquiring advanced educa-
tion requires both time and pecuniary costs. While all specialized workers can work in the
final good sector, only those with the highest ability can work in the innovation sector, as
for instance in Böhm et al. (2015). Rigidities prevail in all segments of the labor market
and unemployment emerges in equilibrium.6
Figure 1 summarizes the production structure and the sectoral distribution of labor.
Although it does not show (for clarity) how employment and unemployment probabilities
are determined, it illustrates fairly well how labor market rigidities aﬀect wage formation
and unemployment, and the feedback eﬀect of unemployment (through its impact on com-
pensation for the unemployed) on expected wages and the decision to acquire advanced
training.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals have identical preferences but are born with diﬀerent abilities, indexed by .
Ability follows a continuous distribution with density function () and cumulative distri-
6We do not model employment protection legislation and therefore do not analyze their impact on
structural unemployment and growth. This is in line with the results of Duval and Furceri (2018), which
show that these measures do not have a medium-term impact on output and employment, only cyclical
eﬀects.
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bution function  (), with support (0 1). For tractability,  is assumed to be uniformly
distributed on its support. Each individual maximizes utility and decides whether to engage
in market work as an untrained worker or (after training) as a specialized worker.
Specifically, an adult with ability  can enter the labor force at the beginning of period 
as an untrained worker and earn the wage  , which is independent of the worker’s ability.
Alternatively, the individual may choose to first spend a fraction  ∈ (0 1) of his/her time
endowment at the beginning of adulthood in higher education, incur a cost   0, and then
enter the labor force for the remainder of the period as a specialized worker, earning either
the wage  if employed in the final good sector, or  if employed in the innovation
sector. During training, workers earn no income. All individuals can either be employed
(superscript ) or unemployed (superscript ). If employed, an untrained individual can
work only in the final good sector. All specialized individuals can work in that sector
as well, but only those with the highest level of ability,   , can potentially work in
the innovation sector. The threshold ability level  is taken to be constant, consistent
with the assumption that, for any given population, the spread of individuals along the
ability continuum is largely determined by nature.7 If unemployed, individuals earn an
unemployment benefit,  ,  =  , which is not taxable.
Let |+ denote consumption at period  +  of an individual  =   , either
employed or unemployed,  = , born at the beginning of period , with  = 0 1. The
individual’s discounted utility function is given by
  =  ln | +
ln |+1
1 +    =     =  (1)
where    0 are the common discount rate and preference parameter for current con-
sumption, respectively.8
The period-specific budget constraints are given by
| +  =
½
(1− )
if  = 
if  =   (2)
| +  =
½
(1− )[(1− ) − ]
(1− ) − 
if  =   =  
if  =  (3)
7Hypotheses such as the Flynn eﬀect in the psychological science literature do suggest that IQ scores
tend to improve as the share of the skilled population grows (see Flynn (2007)). However, this remains a
contentious subject of research and in the absence of conclusive evidence we treat  as fixed.
8Because leisure does not enter the utility function, the opportunity cost of unemployment is simply
the wage foregone.
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|+1 = (1 + +1)   =     =  (4)
where  is savings, 1 + +1 the gross rate of return between periods  and  + 1, and
 ∈ (0 1) the tax rate.
An individual finds it optimal to train if and only if his/her expected earnings as a spe-
cialized worker, adjusted for the time and pecuniary costs of training, exceeds the expected
earnings of an untrained worker:
(1− ){(1− )[  +   ] +   }−  ≥ (1−  )(1− ) +    (5)
where the going wage, or the unemployment benefit, is weighted by the respective prob-
ability of being either employed or unemployed,  ∈ (0 1), for  =    .9
In specifying (5), we assume for simplicity that an individual knows if his/her ability is
above or below the threshold  and can therefore decide whether to acquire specialized
skills or not at the beginning of adulthood, but finds out whether his/her ability is at or
above    only after undergoing training. Put diﬀerently, this specification captures
the idea that an individual discovers whether he/she is “super smart” only upon college
graduation–a sensible assumption in practice.10
The training cost is proportional to the expected specialized wage when employed and
varies inversely with the individual’s ability, which determines how fast (or how well) he or
she can learn:
 = (1− )(  +   ) (6)
with   ∈ (0 1). The assumption on the productivity parameter  ensures that the eﬀect
of ability on training costs is subject to diminishing returns.
As shown in Appendix A, the threshold level of ability  such that all individuals with
9Equation (5) is assumed to hold as a strict inequality for the individual with the highest ability, that is,
 = 1, otherwise nobody would choose to become specialized. In principle, given that agents have concave
utility, they should care not only about the expected value of earnings but also about risk. The decision
to acquire skills should thus depend on expected utility under alternative occupations, as in Agénor and
Alpaslan (2014) for instance. However, in the present setting the resulting condition cannot be solved
explicitly for the threshold level of ability.
10Without this assumption two separate conditions, one for those with    (which would take the
form shown in (5), given that these individuals can work anywhere) and one for those with    (which
would exclude the wage in the innovation sector in calculating the expected specialized wage) would be
required. This would complicate significantly the analysis, without adding much additional insight.
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ability higher than  choose to undergo training is given by
 = 1
½
1− (1− 

 )(1− ) +   − (1− ) 
(1− )(1− )(  +   )
¾−1
 (7)
This equation plays an important role in understanding the dynamics of the labor
market; it shows that labor market outcomes (which are partly influenced by public policy)
have a direct impact on the decision to acquire training, through their eﬀect on expected,
rather than actual, wages.
The productivity of untrained workers is constant regardless of ability and is normalized
to unity. Given (7), the raw supply of untrained labor,  , is equal to the number of
individuals in the population who choose not to undergo training:
 = ¯
Z 
0
() =  ¯ (8)
The raw supply of specialized workers with ability  ∈ (  ) is ¯
R 
 () =
(−  )¯ . However, the average productivity of these workers equals ( + )2; thus,
the eﬀective supply of specialized labor with  ∈ (  ) can be defined as
( −  )( + )
2
¯ = (
)2 − ( )2
2
¯ (9)
As noted earlier, among specialized workers, only those with ability  ∈ ( 1) can
operate in the innovation sector; thus, the (eﬀective) supply of labor to that segment of
the market,  , is
 = (1− 
)( + 1)
2
¯ = 1− (
)2
2
¯ (10)
Adding (9) and (10), the total (eﬀective) supply of specialized workers,  , is
 = 1− (
 )2
2
¯ (11)
However, workers with the highest ability are also able to work in the final good sector,
at the same wage as other specialized workers there. Assuming that all workers with ability
greater than  seek employment in innovation activities first, the supply of specialized la-
bor to manufacturing is not given by  − , but rather by  − , where  ≤ 
is the actual (demand-determined) level of employment in the innovation sector. Thus, to
the extent that    , there is misallocation of talent, in the sense that individuals
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with abilities that are high enough to operate in the innovation sector may end up perform-
ing routine tasks in manufacturing–at a cost to society in terms of growth and welfare. In
our numerical experiments we measure talent misallocation by the share of “overqualified”
workers in the final good sector, defined as max[0 ( − ) ], where  is actual
employment in that sector.
2.2 Final Good
Final good production by firm ,   , requires the use of specialized labor,  , untrained
labor,  , private capital, , aggregate public capital,  , and the combination of
intermediate inputs, , with  ∈ (0).
The production function is specified as
  = [ 

( )¯  ]
[(1− ) ]( ) ()[
Z 
0
] (12)
where      ∈ (0 1),   0,     0,  = 1 − ( + ) − ,  ∈ (0 1) and
1(1−)  1 is (the absolute value of) the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate
good, and  =
R 1
0
 aggregate private capital. Constant returns therefore prevail with
respect to private inputs, and public capital is subject to congestion, measured by aggregate
private capital and population.
Firm ’s profits are defined as
Π =   −
Z 
0
  − (1 + )[ (1− ) +   ]− ( +  )
where  ∈ (0 1) is the depreciation rate and    0 is the firm’s contribution rate to the
unemployment insurance scheme, based on its total wage bill.
Each firm maximizes profits subject to (12) with respect to labor, private capital, and
quantities of intermediate goods , ∀, taking factor prices and as given. This yields,
in standard fashion,
 = ( 

1 +   )

(1− )  
 = (

1 +  )

  (13)
 = ()−   (14)
 = (  )
1(1−)  = 1  (15)
 = 
Z 
0
() (16)
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2.3 Intermediate Goods
As in Romer (1990), intermediate goods firms produce inputs based on blueprints produced
by the innovation sector. Each firm produces one, and only one, horizontally-diﬀerentiated
good, using the same technology used to produce the final good. Production of each unit
of intermediate goods costs one unit of final output.
Each producer must purchase a patented design from the innovation sector. Once the
patent fee  is paid, each producer sets its price to maximize profits, given the perceived
demand function for its good (15), which determines marginal revenue. Under a symmetric
equilibrium, profits are given by Π = ( − 1) or, using (15) and (16), Π = ( −
1)[ ]1(1−). In standard fashion, the solution yields the optimal price as
  = 1  ∀ = 1  (17)
Using (15), the quantity demanded at this price is  = ()1(1−), ∀, that is,
noting that under symmetry
R
0
 = ,
 = (  ) (18)
with maximum profit given by
Π = (1− )(  ) (19)
Intermediate-input producing firms last only one period, and patents are auctioned oﬀ
randomly to a new group of firms in each period. Thus, each firm holds a patent only for
the period during which it is bought, implying monopoly profits during that period only;
yet patents last forever.11 By arbitrage, therefore,
 = Π  (20)
2.4 Innovation Sector
Firms in the innovation sector use only high-ability specialized labor, in quantity (1−) .
There is no aggregate uncertainty and the production technology is
+1 − =  [
 (1− )
¯ ]
 (21)
11This assumption simplifies significantly the analysis; see Agénor and Canuto (2015b) for a discussion.
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where  is the level of eﬀort and  productivity, which depends on access to public
infrastructure and, consistent with the standing-on-shoulder eﬀect (see Jones (2005)), the
stock of knowledge:
 = ( )1 (22)
with  =   and 1  0. Thus, in terms of eﬃciency units of labor, eﬀort and work-
ers are perfect substitutes. Because of duplication eﬀects there are diminishing marginal
returns to labor, so that  ∈ (0 1).12 Access to public capital is subject to (proportional)
congestion, measured (for simplicity) by private capital only. In addition, to eliminate scale
eﬀects, as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) innovation diﬃculty is measured in terms
of population size.
Eﬀort is modeled following the simple specification developed in Agénor and Aizenman
(1999). In deciding how much eﬀort to provide at , researchers evaluate a period utility
function, (  1−  ), which depends on the wage earned,  , and the disutility of
eﬀort, 1−  :
[  1−  ] = ln[(1− ) )(1−  )1− ] (23)
where  ∈ (0 1). Let  denote the probability that a researcher is caught shirking, in
which case he is fired and ends up being either employed in manufacturing, at the going
wage  , or unemployed, collecting the benefit  . In line with the standard Shapiro-
Stiglitz shirking model, we assume that  is related one-to-one with the intensity with
which firms in the innovation sector choose to monitor their workers.
The level of eﬀort provided is either  , when employed and not shirking, or the min-
imum  ∈ (0 1), when shirking while employed. The optimal level of eﬀort is such that
the utility derived from working without shirking (as given by (23)) is at least equal to the
expected utility of shirking:
(  1−  ) ≥  ln[( (1− ) +   )(1− )1− ] (24)
+(1− ) ln[((1− ) )(1− )1− ]
where the latter is defined as a weighted average of the expected income earned if caught
shirking and fired with probability  (either working at the alternative wage  , with
probability  , or unemployed, with probability  , and earning the benefit  ) and
12See Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a discussion.
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if not caught with probability 1 −  (earning the going wage  ). In either case, for
simplicity the worker provides the minimum eﬀort level .
In equilibrium, workers are indiﬀerent between shirking and not shirking; condition (24)
therefore holds with equality and can be solved to give
 = 1− (1− )[

 (1− ) +  
(1− ) ]
 (25)
with  = (1 − ). Thus, an increase in the expected wage in the innovation sector
relative to its opportunity cost raises the level of eﬀort. For a given wage ratio, an increase
in the probability of getting caught shirking (a rise in ) raises also the level of eﬀort.13
Using (21), and taking the patent fee and productivity as given, the firm’s problem is
to maximize profits by setting both wages and employment:
max
 
Π =  [
 (1− )
¯ ]
 − (1 +  ) (1− )  (26)
subject to (25). The first-order conditions are given by
( )−1( )(1− )

¯ = (1 + )(1− )
  (27)
( )−1

¯ [(1− )
 ]
(1−  )
 = (1 + )(1− )
  (28)
These equations can be combined to give
 = [ (1− ) +   ] (29)
where14
 = [(1 + )(1− 
)]1
1−   1
Thus, the eﬃciency wage is proportional to, and higher than, the (expected) opportunity
cost of working in the innovation sector. At the optimal wage, the equilibrium level of eﬀort
is constant at ˜ = 1− (1− )()−  0.
13If eﬀort is independent of relative wages ( = 0) then  = .
14The Solow condition, which requires (  )(  ) = 1, can be directly established from (27)
and (28) and by noting that   = (1−  ) .
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2.5 Government
The government operates both a general budget and an unemployment insurance fund. It
cannot issue bonds and must run balanced accounts in both cases. To finance its general
outlays, the government levies a tax on wages at the rate  . These outlays consist of
investment in infrastructure,  , and spending on other (not directly productive) items,
 . It imposes no fees for its services.
The government’s general budget is given by
 + = {  + [ ((1− ) − ) + ( − )]} (30)
Shares of spending are constant fractions of government revenues:
 = {  + [ ((1− ) − ) + ( − )]}  =   (31)
where  ∈ (0 1). Combining (30) and (31) therefore yields
 +  = 1 (32)
Let  ,  =   , denote the proportion of employed individuals of category  in
the adult population ¯ , and let  ,  =  , denote the unemployment rate (again, in
proportion of ¯) of labor category ; the unemployment insurance fund’s budget is given
by
(  +   )¯ =  {  + (1− )(  +   )}¯
which implies
  = 
  +  
  + (1− )(  +   )
 (33)
Thus, all else equal, a higher benefit rate ( or  ) raises the payroll contribution rate,
thereby reducing labor demand. In turn, the reduction in labor demand (through a fall
in employment ratios) mitigates the initial increase in the contribution rate at the initial
unemployment and wage rates.
Assuming full depreciation, the stock of public capital evolves according to
+1 =   (34)
where  ∈ (0 1) is an eﬃciency parameter, which measures the extent to which investment
outlays translate into actual public capital (Agénor, 2012).
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To ensure the existence of a nondegenerate solution, the unemployment benefit is set
as a linear function of the level of per capita income, so that
 = ¯  (35)
where  ∈ (0 1), with  =  , is the benefit indexation parameter.
2.6 The Labor Market
Wages in the final good sector are set in a monopoly union setting. The centralized trade
union’s objective is to maximize the expected current income of both types of workers in
manufacturing, subject to wage and employment targets.15
Specifically, the union sets  and  with the objective of maximizing a utility
function that depends on deviations of both employment and wages from their target levels,
subject to the manufacturing sector’s demand schedule for each type of labor. Normalizing
the employment target to zero, the union’s utility function takes the standard form
V = ( −  )( )1−
where  =   ,  ∈ (0 1), and  is given in (13). The term  measures the
union’s target wage, whereas  reflects the relative importance that the union attaches to
wage deviations from that target. Maximizing this function with respect to  gives the
actual wage as a mark-up (which is increasing in ) over the target wage:16
 = ( 1− 

1− 2 )
  (36)
The target wage for untrained workers is related positively to a government-imposed
minimum wage,  , and negatively to the unemployment rate for that category of labor,
 :
 =  ( )−κ 
where κ  0. Thus, when unemployment is high, the probability of finding a job (at
any given wage) is low. Consequently, the higher the unemployment rate, the greater the
15The union’s optimization problem is static, in the sense that when it formulates its wage demands it
takes the existing capital stock as given and does not internalize the eﬀect of future wages on the firm’s
decision to accumulate capital–and thus future labor demand. This is tantamount to assuming sequential
wage bargaining and the absence of reputational links across periods.
16To ensure that   0 requires   05, a condition that we impose in the parameterisation.
15
incentive for the union to moderate its wage demands in order to induce firms to increase
employment.17
In turn, the minimum wage is linearly related to the level of per capita income:
 = 0 (¯ ) (37)
where 0  0 is an indexation parameter.
Substituting the above expressions into (36) therefore yields
 = 0 ( 1− 

1− 2 )(

¯ )(

 )−κ
  (38)
The target wage for specialized workers is negatively related as well to the unemploy-
ment rate for that category of workers,  , and linearly related once again to the level
of per capita income, ¯ , so that   = 0 ( )−κ¯ , where 0  0 is an
indexation parameter. Inserting this result into (36) yields
 = 0 ( 1− 

1− 2 )(

 )−κ

(

¯ ) (39)
The equilibrium condition of the market for untrained labor is given by
 =  + 
where  is the number of unemployed. Equivalently, in terms of ratios to population,
 =  +   (40)
where  =  ¯ , which from (8) is equal to  . Thus, the probability of employment
for an untrained individual,  , and the probability of an untrained individual becoming
unemployed,  , are given respectively by
 = 



 and  = 1−  = 



 (41)
The equilibrium condition of the market for (eﬀective) specialized labor is given by:
 =  + + 
17This specification, as discussed in Agénor (2006), is consistent with the empirical prediction of models
of the wage curve.
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or equivalently, in terms of ratios to population,
 =  +  +   (42)
The employment and unemployment probabilities for specialized workers are given by
 = 



  = 



 and  = 1−  −  = 



. (43)
2.7 Savings-Investment Balance
Assuming full depreciation ( = 1), the saving-investment balance requires private capital
in +1 to be equal to savings in period  by all individuals, employed or unemployed, born
in − 1:
+1 = (  +   ) + (  +   +   ) (44)
3 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
In this economy, an equilibrium with imperfect competition and unemployment is a se-
quence of consumption and saving allocations {|  |+1  }∞=0, for  =   ,
 = , prices of production inputs {      +1}∞=0, private capital { }∞=0,
public capital { }∞=0, existing varieties {}∞=0, prices and quantities of intermediate
inputs {   }∞=0, ∀ ∈ (0), such that, given initial stocks 0  0 0  0,
a) all individuals, specialized or untrained, employed or unemployed, maximize utility
by choosing consumption subject to their intertemporal budget constraint, taking factor
prices, the tax rate, and the unemployment benefit as given;
b) firms in the final good sector maximize profits by choosing labor, private capital, and
intermediate inputs, taking factor prices as given;
c) intermediate input producers set prices so as to maximize profits, while internalizing
the eﬀect of their decisions on the perceived aggregate demand curve for their product;
d) producers in the innovation sector maximize profits by choosing labor and wages,
taking patent prices and productivity as given;
e) the price of each blueprint extracts all profits made by the corresponding intermediate
input producer;
f ) the trade union in the manufacturing sector sets wages so as to maximize its utility,
subject to the demand for labor by firms in the final good sector;
g) the final good market clears, or equivalently savings equals investment; and
h) unemployment of both categories of workers prevails.
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A balanced growth equilibrium is an equilibrium with imperfect competition and unem-
ployment in which
a) {|  |+1  }∞=0, for  =   ,  = , and , , ,,  ,  ,  ,
 ,  =  , grow at the constant, endogenous rate 1 + , implying that the knowledge-
private capital ratio and the public-private capital ratio are constant;
b) the rate of return on capital, 1 + +1, is constant;
c) the price of intermediate goods, , and the patent price, , are constant;
e) the threshold level of individuals who choose to remain untrained,  , is constant;
f ) the fractions of the specialized and untrained labor force employed in manufacturing,
 and  , and the fraction of specialized workers employed in the innovation sector, , are constant;
g) specialized and untrained unemployment rates,  and  , are constant; and
h) employment and unemployment probabilities,  ,  ,  , and  ,  are con-
stant.
4 Properties of the Equilibrium
A complete analytical solution of the model is provided in Appendix A. A key step in
deriving the equilibrium growth rate is to establish the restrictions needed on the congestion
parameters in (12). With  =  denoting the knowledge-private capital ratio,
equation (12) yields
 = (1− )( )( )
+− (45)
×( )
½
Λ1(1−) (  )
¾
( )++(1−)
where Λ1 = . To ensure that production is linear in the private capital stock,  and 
must satisfy the conditions  +  −  = 0 and +  + (1− ) = 1. As a result,
the level of output becomes:
 = (
 )(1−)Λ2
[( )( ) ]−1(1−)
((1−))(1−)  (46)
where Λ2 = (1− )Λ(1−)1 .
In Appendix A we also show that the model can be condensed in the form of a system
consisting of two first-order dynamic equations in terms of the knowledge-private capital
ratio, , and the public-private capital ratio,  , as well as 9 core static equations, in
terms of the output-private capital ratio,  , the patent price, , the threshold level of
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ability (or equivalently the share of untrained workers),  , the shares of specialized workers
in final good production and innovation activities,  and  , the share of untrained
workers in final good production,  , the shares of specialized and untrained workers
in unemployment,  and  , and the payroll contribution rate,   . The steady-state
growth rate, 1 + γ, is shown to be18
1 + γ = ()(1− )()1 () (47)
Given the complexity of the system, stability of the economy cannot be studied ana-
lytically. However, it is established numerically (based on the calibration discussed next)
by solving for an initial balanced growth equilibrium that satisfies the properties defined
earlier and verifying that following a shock, or combination of shocks, the system converges
to a new equilibrium in a finite number of periods.
5 Calibration
To study the impact of labor market reforms, we calibrate the model for a stylized middle-
income economy, based on the averages for the five upper-income Latin American countries
mentioned in the introduction (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru).19 Together,
these countries accounted for about 75 percent of the region’s GDP over the period 200-14.
They have a relatively small innovation sector (both in terms of employment and capacity
to create knowledge) and are characterized by significant labor market rigidities and high
levels of unemployment, caused largely by permanent, structural factors rather than cyclical
determinants, as documented by the Inter-American Development Bank (2004), Ball et al.
(2011), and the International Labour Organization (2017). The main sources of data are the
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the International Labour Organization (ILO),
and the World Bank. For convenience, population is normalized to unity.
On the household side, estimates based on household surveys by Gandelman (2015) are
used to set the savings rate  at 0138. The average school life expectancy at tertiary level
for the five Latin American economies is 307 years, which gives  = 0123. To account for
more costly and less eﬃcient training, and in the absence of data, the training cost  is
18From the equations in Appendix A, and given that all stock variables grow at the same rate in equi-
librium, other equivalent forms for the steady-state growth rate can of course be defined.
19We do not include Mexico in our sample because of its low unemployment rate.
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set at 012, and the eﬃciency of training  at 05, as in Agénor and Alpaslan (2014). In
the final good sector, the elasticity of production with respect to the public-private capital
ratio  is set at 024, in line with the general equilibrium estimates of Agénor and Neanidis
(2015). The elasticity parameter with respect to private capital, , is set equal to 035.
This is the average value for the five Latin American economies used for instance in the
growth accounting exercises of Loayza et al. (2005). In line with studies using growth
models for Latin America, we set  = 020 and  = 035, so that  = 01 again.20
In the intermediate good sector, the substitution parameter, , is set at 025, which
corresponds to the value used by Agénor and Neanidis (2015) to examine innovation-driven
growth. This value implies therefore a low elasticity of substitution (about 133) between
intermediate goods, a well-documented feature for Latin American economies. In the same
vein, in the innovation sector 1 is set at 03, which is consistent with higher range of
estimates obtained by Agénor and Neanidis (2015). To parameterize for a benchmark case
where research monitoring is weak, the probability of being caught shirking is set at slightly
below 5 percent,  = 0048. This yields  = 043.
For the government, to be consistent with the model definition, using data from World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) within the period of 2006-13, the eﬀective
tax rate on wages,  , is calculated by dividing the estimated weighted average ratio of tax
revenues to GDP with the average share of labor income estimated for the corresponding
sample of countries by Guerriero (2012). This yields  = 0123. The eﬃciency parameter
of government investment, , is calibrated using the ‘wastefulness of government spending’
indicator in the Global Competitiveness Report index, which yields  = 04. This estimate
of  is close to the median value obtained by Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) in their study of
the eﬃciency of public investment in developing countries. The share of public spending
on infrastructure,  , is estimated in two steps, based on the data on total infrastructure
investment as a proportion of GDP compiled by Calderon and Servén (2010) and Carranza
et al. (2014). The private component of total investment, obtained from the World Bank’s
Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, is first subtracted to obtain the share
of public infrastructure investment as a proportion of GDP. This figure is then multiplied
by the inverse of the ratio of non-interest government expenditure to GDP to obtain an
20See Agénor and Canuto (2015a) for Brazil, and Ferreira et al. (2013) for Latin America.
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estimate of  for each of the five Latin American economies. The average value for the
five economies for the period 2006-13 gives  = 0069, or equivalently 20 percent of GDP.
Regarding the labor market, in the absence of Latin America-specific estimates, we use
the European estimates in Montuenga et al. (2003), who estimated the wage elasticity with
respect to unemployment rate to be approximately −012. This means κ = κ = 012.
The minimum wage shift parameter, 0 , is calibrated based on the average ratio of the
gross monthly minimum wage over gross monthly earnings, as provided in ILO Statistics.
This gives 0 = 0546. For 0 , the median wage diﬀerentials between secondary-primary
and secondary-tertiary are used (see Inter-American Development Bank (2004, Table 1.8))
to estimate an average value for wage dispersion in the five Latin American economies. This
yields 0153, which implies, solving again (39) implicitly, 0 = 0699. In terms of unem-
ployment benefits (which cover in reality a fairly limited number of workers), estimates by
Cortazar (2001) and Ferrer and Riddell (2009) suggest that for the group of countries un-
der consideration, unemployment insurance represents from 012 to 25 times the minimum
wage. Multiplying by 0 = 0546 yields a range of 006-082 for  and . Mid-range
value of  =  = 04, which also happens to be the value commonly used in partial
equilibrium model with unemployment insurance (see Heer and Morgenstern (2005)), is
therefore used. Lastly, for the union wage mark-up, the Inter-American Development Bank
(2004) documents that unions in South America increase their members’ earnings by any-
where between 5 and 10 percent. Setting the wage mark-up to 11, and again solving (36)
backward yields  =  = 008.
In terms of initial steady-state values, the labor shares are estimated using data from
ILO and the World Bank. The share of untrained workers in the population,  , is set equal
to 0795, which yields  = 0184. The share of eﬀective specialized workers in innovation,
, is estimated by dividing the average number of researchers over the total workforce for
the five economies over 2006-13, yielding  = 0004. The share of unemployed specialized
workers, , is set equal to 0071, based on ILO data. By implication,  = 0109. The
unemployment rate for untrained workers, , is also obtained from ILO data and is set at
0087. These data therefore imply that  = 0708, and the aggregate unemployment rate
is now 00791. To estimate for the misallocation of talents, in the absence of Latin American
data, we first work out a  value using (10), based on the OECD-average proportion of
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workers who are overqualified. This yields  = 0952.21 Theoretically, this threshold
value, , should be the same across all economies. Using this, and the calibrated values
for  and  , we can solve backward using the formula, ( − ) , to yield the
initial degree of talent misallocation at 0392. Compared to the OECD data, this would
mean that there are a lot more overqualified workers in the final good sector of a middle-
income economy, consistent with recent theories of middle-income traps (Agénor, 2017).
The firms’ payroll contribution rate, , is set at 0052.22 The initial relative wage ratio is
estimated at 075 based on ILO data, implying that the initial expected wage premium
is at 1333. The public-private capital ratio calculated for Brazil by Agénor and Canuto
(2015a),  = 0147, is used as a proxy for the group average. The final output-private
capital ratio,  , is calibrated using the private capital-GDP ratios for Argentina, Brazil
and Chile estimated by Tafunell and Ducoing (2016). This yields  = 0429. The
knowledge-private capital ratio, , is normalized to 01. Lastly, the annual growth rates
for final output and capital in the initial steady state equal to 39 percent, based on the
GDP-weighted average growth rate of the five economies during 2006-13.
6 Policy Experiments
We now consider a series of individual labor market policies–a reduction in the minimum
wage, a cut in unemployment benefit rates, and a reduction in the union’s wage mark-up. In
addition, we also consider a policy aimed at promoting the accumulation of human capital
(a cut in training cost). These policies have been discussed extensively in recent years.23
All shocks are permanent and their impact is measured in terms of a few key variables–the
supply of untrained workers, the eﬀective supply of specialized workers (both total and in
the innovation sector), the expected wage premium (which determines training decisions),
21Using OECD figures calculated on the basis of the EU Labour Force Survey, we first set  as equal the
“proportion of workers whose educational attainment level is higher than the level required in their job (as
measured based on the modal education level for all workers in the same occupation).” The OECD average
over 2006-13 equals 0189. Based on that value, and knowing that from (10)  = [1 − ()2]2, we get
 = 0952. This value should be the same across diﬀerent populations, regardless of income levels.
22While payroll taxes represent on average of 31 percent of wages in Latin America (see Lora and Fajardo
(2012)), only the portion that employers contribute to the unemployment/severance fund is accounted for
here.
23See Inter-American Development Bank (2004), World Bank (2012a, 2012b), Adascalitei and Pignatti
Morano (2015) and International Monetary Fund (2016) for instance.
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unemployment rates (total and for both categories of workers), the payroll contribution
rate, and the growth rate of final output.
To measure the eﬃciency gains of reforms in terms of factor allocation, the index of
misallocation of talent defined earlier is used. To measure welfare, discounted utility across
an infinite sequence of generations is used (see De la Croix and Michel, 2002, p. 91):
W = 02
∞X
=0
Λ( + +  + +  + +  + +  + ) (48)
where Λ ∈ (0 1) is the social discount factor and   is the indirect utility function for agent
  at , where  =    and  = . Thus, the utility of agents in each generation
in all five states–untrained workers employed or unemployed, specialized workers employed
in the final good sector and innovation activities or unemployed–are equally weighted.24
For tractability, we restrict our analysis to the balanced growth path; Appendix B provides
an approximation to (48) along that path, with Λ set to the same value used for households.
Simulation results (impact and steady-state eﬀects) are summarized in Table 3, whereas
Figure 2 shows the impact and steady-state eﬀects for all experiments.
6.1 Reduction in the Minimum Wage
Consider a reduction in the minimum wage, measured by a 5 percent drop in the shift para-
meter 0 . The reduction in the cost of untrained labor increases demand not only for that
category of workers but also (due to gross complementarity) for specialized labor in man-
ufacturing. At the initial level of wages, the unemployment rate falls and the employment
probability rises for both categories of workers. However, the expected wage for specialized
workers increases by more than the expected wage for untrained workers, thereby creating
incentives to invest in advanced training. The proportion of untrained (specialized) workers
therefore falls (increases) on impact. The increase in specialized employment occurs in both
the final good and innovation sectors, though not all specialized labor from the expansion
are absorbed, resulting in a slight increase in long-run specialized unemployment rate. The
long-run drop in unemployment is particularly large for untrained workers, of the order of
24Alternatively, weights based on steady-state relative shares of each group of workers in the labor
force (which deviate from baseline values as a result of the labor reallocation eﬀects associated with each
experiment), could be used. Qualitatively the results are broadly similar to those reported here.
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20 percent.25
Higher employment for both types of workers translate into a reduction in the pay-
roll contribution rate, which magnifies the expansion in labor demand in manufacturing.
Although the initial fall in unemployment tends to raise the union’s target wages in the
manufacturing sector–thereby mitigating the initial eﬀect of a lower minimum wage–the
increased demand for both types of workers tends to promote activity and economic growth,
both on impact and in the long run. However, the long-run eﬀects are fairly small.
Higher wages for specialized workers in manufacturing imply higher wages in the inno-
vation sector as well, to maintain eﬀort there. This helps to increase the share of that type
of labor engaged in innovation activity, thereby mitigating the misallocation of talent, by
a magnitude of 04 percentage points in the long run. In addition, welfare improves mod-
erately. In terms of their magnitude, both results reflect a small increase in employment
in the innovation sector, a weak eﬀect on the expansion of varieties of intermediate goods,
and therefore a small impact on growth in the long run. Overall, lower minimum wages
do not necessarily harm growth and welfare–in contrast to the predictions of some small
analytical models, such as Cahuc and Michel (1996)–but their eﬀects on these variables,
given our calibration, are not quantitatively large.
6.2 Reduction in Unemployment Benefit Rates
We consider three separate experiments with respect to a scaling down in unemployment
benefit indexation: a) a reduction in the indexation parameter for only untrained workers,
b) a reduction for only specialized workers, and c) a reduction for both type of workers.
Specifically, we consider cuts in  and  by 10 percent (from 040 to 036) each, and
a joint reduction in  and  of the same magnitude. These experiments allow us to
examine and compare the eﬀects of asymmetric adjustments in unemployment insurance
schemes, as well as the case of an across-the-board reform.
A reduction in the benefit rate for untrained workers lowers their expected wage at the
initial level of employment. It therefore raises the education premium and incentives to
undergo training. As a result, the share of untrained (specialized) workers falls (increases).
25The reduction in unemployment is consistent with the evidence reviewed by Neumark and Wascher
(2006) although, as they point out, the wide range of estimates makes the precise identification of the
magnitude of this eﬀect diﬃcult.
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The opposite occurs for a reduction in the benefit rate for specialized workers. However, in
both cases aggregate unemployment falls, both on impact and in the long run. This stems
from the fact that the direct eﬀect of a lower wage is (as a result of gross complementarity) to
stimulate the demand for both types of labor. This eﬀect, which is magnified by a reduction
in the payroll contribution rate needed to ensure that the unemployment fund’s budget is
balanced, persists over time as well. Long-run specialized (untrained) unemployment rate
increases slightly when the indexation parameter is reduced for the untrained (specialized)
workers. This is due to a weaker gross complementarity eﬀect and a smaller expansion
in the innovation sector, which mitigates its capacity to absorb the increase in specialized
labor.
On impact, the growth rate of final output falls. The reason is that the drop in benefits
for the unemployed has an adverse eﬀect on savings, which reduces investment and capital
accumulation in the short run. Over time, however, two oﬀsetting general equilibrium
eﬀects kick in: lower benefits (for untrained workers) improve incentives for individuals to
acquire training, whereas a lower contribution rate raises labor demand. In the long run the
net eﬀect of the policy is in fact positive–albeit fairly weak. Although talent misallocation
is mitigated, welfare falls (for either shock) essentially because the unemployed are worse oﬀ.
The joint reduction in unemployment benefit indexation gives results that are qualitatively
similar to those obtained in the individual experiments, and in this instance, unemployment
falls–both at the aggregate level and in its components.
The conflicting eﬀect on long-run growth and welfare has not been documented in
previous contributions. It suggests that a reduction in unemployment benefit indexation,
while eﬀective in terms of reducing unemployment for both types of labor, may need to
be accompanied by other measures aimed at mitigating their potential adverse impact on
household well-being.
6.3 Reduction in the Union’s Wage Mark-Up
Consider a reduction in the mark-up over the target wage for both untrained and special-
ized workers, as measured by the parameters  and  , respectively (see (36)). This
experiment involves a uniform 375 percent cut in these parameters, from 008 to 005.26
26It is important to understand that  and  are preference parameters, which are not directly under
the control of policymakers. However, we assume that, through appropriate legislation, public authorities
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The overall general equilibrium eﬀects of this specific labor market policy are small.
The  shock is eﬀective in reducing unemployment rate for the untrained, but negligible
for the specialized unemployment rate. For the  shock, the opposite is observed. In the
long run the growth eﬀects are also fairly small. Welfare deteriorates when the mark-up
for specialized workers is reduced, but improves slightly when the mark-up for untrained
workers is lowered. Again, these results suggest that, taken in isolation, these policies do
not have substantial eﬀects on growth and unemployment in the long run, and may be
detrimental to welfare.
6.4 Reduction in Training Cost
Finally, consider a policy designed to reduce across the board the cost of specialized training
for individuals, paid for by a reallocation of outlays within the unproductive component
of public spending. The policy once again has no direct fiscal eﬀects and is measured by
a reduction in  by 5 percent, from 0120 to 0114. The size of this shock is suﬃcient to
illustrate the issues at stake.
A reduction in training costs generates a large increase in the supply of specialized
workers by 38 percentage points in the long run, a fraction of which being absorbed in the
innovation sector. This increase in supply occurs despite the mitigating eﬀect on wages for
that category of workers and a drop in the expected wage premium. The reduction in the
share of untrained workers has a sizable eﬀect on their unemployment rate; however, the
large increase in the supply of specialized workers leads over time to a higher unemployment
rate for them (by 32 percentage points in the long run). The thrust of these results is that
promoting human capital accumulation without adequate measures aimed at encouraging
simultaneously a sustained expansion in labor demand may create an absorption problem
or oversupply of specialized labor in the long run.
In addition, the positive eﬀect on the rate of economic growth is small both on impact
and in the long-run. The reason, as noted earlier, is that the net benefit of an increase in
the supply of specialized workers is muted, due to a smaller expansion in labor demand in
the innovation sector. The increase in the specialized unemployment rate also results in a
higher payroll contribution rate, which mitigates the increase in labor demand and dampens
can induce trade unions to mitigate their wage demands, and this requires, in our setting, a change in 
and  .
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steady-state growth. Nevertheless, and despite the increase in specialized unemployment,
welfare improves because employed untrained workers and both types of unemployed work-
ers gain from this policy. For the former, this is because wages are ultimately higher than
initially. For the unemployed, this is because unemployment benefits are higher along the
equilibrium path, due to higher steady-state growth.
Evidence on the oversupply problem highlighted in our simulation results is consistent
with the extensive microeconomic literature on overeducation, which has been reviewed
by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011). It is also an important problem in Latin America,
including for the countries in our sample. In Brazil for instance, Marioni (2018) found
that over the period 2006-13, 247 percent of employed workers in the formal labor market
were overeducated. In Colombia, as documented by Mora (2008), that proportion was 14
percent in 2006. Our analysis suggests that the main cause of the overeducation problem
in the region may have been deliberate public policies aimed at expanding higher education
and making it more aﬀordable to all, by reducing tuition fees in universities.
Indeed, the number of new universities or university programs in the region has ex-
panded steadily since the early 2000s, to reduce the real eﬀective cost of tertiary education.
According to Camacho et al. (2016), between 2005 and 2010, 308 and 74 new universities
were created in Brazil and Peru, while in Colombia and Chile the expansion was in the
form of a boost in programs oﬀered by existing institutions. For instance, in Brazil, despite
its public university entrance examination system, vestibular, remains highly competitive,
the Ministry of Education has implemented various policies since the early 2000s aimed at
reducing the real cost of higher education, resulting in enrollments in Brazilian universities
to skyrocket from 3 million to 7.8 million students.27 Similar rapid expansions were also
observed for the other economies in our sample, as discussed in Ferreyra et al. (2017).
While this expansion resulted in many households having greater access to tertiary educa-
tion, with the supply of skilled jobs lagging behind, it has caused a decline in returns to
human capital, hence the absorption problem.
The negative correlation between the incentive to acquire skills and the supply of special-
ized workers induced by a reduction in the cost of training, as predicted here, is consistent
27These include Programa de Financiamento Estudantil initiated in 1999, which is a student loans scheme
covering 70 percent of tuition fees charged at a very low interest, and Programa Universidade para Todos,
implemented in late 2004, which provides incentives to private universities to allocate their unfilled places
free of charge to low-income students.
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with an inverse association between increases in the number of university graduates and
the wage premium. The model also predicts that more university graduates may lead to
higher open unemployment. Evidence to support this result is more diﬃcult to come by
for at least three reasons. First, higher unemployment rates for new university graduates
often result from mismatches between supply and demand for particular skills (for instance,
liberal arts), or low quality standards–an important problem in Latin America, as noted
by Yamada (2015)–rather than an across-the-board lack of demand for labor, as predicted
by our experiment. Second, rather than open unemployment, in practice university grad-
uates may choose to be employed in occupations that do not fully exploit their skill levels,
which therefore translates into underemployment or disguised unemployment.28 Finally,
graduates may also choose to migrate abroad, a form of brain drain. Although the model
does not explicitly capture any of these possibilities it does nevertheless draw attention to
the adverse labor market eﬀects of an oversupply of skills, due to a low eﬀective cost of
education promoted by government subsidies. Social demands to expand access to higher
education may ultimately prove counterproductive.
7 Composite Reform Programs
The foregoing analysis suggests that reforms may entail dynamic trade-oﬀs: they can have
adverse eﬀects on the labor market and growth on impact, despite improving these out-
comes in the long run. This trade-oﬀ could induce a government motivated by short-term
electoral considerations to postpone, or abandon altogether, the implementation of struc-
tural reforms. In addition, growth and welfare may move in opposite directions in the long
run, as illustrated in the case of a reduction in the degree of indexation of unemployment
benefits and a cut in the trade union’s mark-up on specialized workers’ wage target. A nat-
ural issue to address therefore is to what extent a combination of measures–assuming that
it is politically feasible–can, by exploiting policy externalities, mitigate the contrasting
eﬀects associated with individual reforms.
Accordingly, we now consider alternative composite reform programs involving a com-
bination of the individual policies discussed earlier. In addition, we examine the extent to
28The possibility that underemployment may result from overeducation is also noted by Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2011).
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which composite programs designed to reduce unemployment and promote growth would
benefit from an increase in public infrastructure investment. This issue has been much dis-
cussed in Latin America, with the shortage of basic infrastructure (including core internet
access) remains at large and calls for higher public investment have been consistently vocal
(Serebrisky et al. (2015)).
7.1 Core Programs
Two core composite reform programs are considered first. In both of them we assume that
the key objectives of policymakers are to reduce unemployment and to promote skills ac-
quisition to support innovation-driven growth. Given that the distribution of high-ability
individuals in the population is fixed, the latter objective can be achieved only by raising the
productivity of those currently employed in the innovation sector, in order to induce higher
wages and reduce the misallocation of talent. The combination of policies considered, al-
though fairly targeted (given our focus on structural, rather than cyclical, unemployment),
is consistent with long-standing calls for comprehensive programs of labor market reforms,
as noted earlier.
The first program, denoted Program A, consists of pure labor market reform measures.
It involves a cut in the minimum wage, as measured by a 10 percent decrease in the shift
parameter 0 , a reduction in the unemployment benefit indexation parameters,  and
, by 625 percent (from 04 to 0375), and a 375 percent cut in the union’s untrained
wage preference parameter  (a drop from 008 to 005).29
The second program, Program B, adds human capital-promoting policies to these mea-
sures, to exploit potential gains associated with a skills expansion. Specifically, in addition
to the measures in Program A, Program B adds an increase in specialized training time,
as measured by , and a reduction in the specialized training cost, .30
The impact and steady-state eﬀects of both programs are shown in Table 4. The
outcome of the combined shocks is, naturally enough, a composite of the features out-
lined earlier. The eﬀects of Program A, which consists of pure labor market reforms, are
29We consider an across-the-board cut in unemployment benefit indexation, even though we assume that
reforms mainly target untrained unemployment, because this is the way these policies are implemented in
practice.
30This translates into a rise in  from 0123 to 015 and a fall in  from 0120 to 0114.
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clear: reductions in both untrained and specialized unemployment rates in the steady state.
Specifically, the former (latter) drops by 49 percent (01 percent). There are also reduced
misallocation of talent, small gains in both overall specialized workers and the propor-
tion employed in the innovation sector (despite the increase in the wage premium), weak
growth eﬀects, and a deterioration in social welfare. This last result is largely due to the
unemployed being worse oﬀ from the benefits cut.
As expected, the results for Program B show a fairly significant increase (reduction) in
the supply of specialized (untrained) workers–of the order of 38 (−49) in the long run–
and reduced misallocation of talent. Nevertheless, the change in welfare remains negative,
and in the long run the economy suﬀers from a higher unemployment rate for specialized
labor–the oversupply problem discussed earlier.
In this setting, the response to this issue is to either a) lower supply, by reducing
incentives to accumulate human capital, or b) expand demand, by implementing additional
policies. Regarding a), making the reduction in the cost of training in Program B smaller
obviously leads to lower specialized unemployment in the long run. More interesting in
the current economic context is to focus on b), by considering next whether a concomitant
increase in public investment may provide the required stimulus.
7.2 Infrastructure Investment
We now consider whether comprehensive labor market reform programs perform better
when accompanied by an increase in public infrastructure investment. The important
point about this type of spending is that it has both demand-side eﬀects (in the short run)
and supply-side eﬀects (in the longer run) by boosting directly the economy’s capacity
to produce and by stimulating private investment through a higher marginal product of
capital. In addition, in our setting improved access to infrastructure helps to promote
innovation activity, especially through its impact on knowledge networks, as emphasized
in the recent literature.31 In that sense, therefore, the provision of public capital is also a
productivity-enhancing measure for research activities.
To examine this issue, an additional reform program is considered: Program C, which
31See Agénor (2017) and the references therein. The eﬀects of an increase in public investment, considered
in isolation, are shown in Table 3; these eﬀects are faily muted and show again conflicting eﬀects on growth
and welfare.
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adds to Program B a 20 percent increase in the share of public spending on infrastructure,
 , from 0069 to 0083. The impact and long-run eﬀects of this program are shown also in
Table 4. While the specialized unemployment rate does fall marginally, it is insignificant
and the absorption problem is only slightly mitigated. Moreover, the change in welfare
remains negative.
As noted earlier, addressing the labor absorption issue could be achieved by reducing
incentives to acquire skills–namely, by keeping the cost of training high. The question here
is whether more ambitious policies aimed at increasing labor demand in both the innovation
and final good sectors can prevent a rise in specialized unemployment–even when training
costs are lowered by as much as before. Indeed, consider ProgramC and suppose that public
investment in infrastructure is now increased from 20 percent of GDP to 62 percent–which
translates into an increase in  from 69 percent of noninterest public expenditure to 21
percent. This value is consistent with the upper range of estimates reported by Serebrisky
et al. (2015, p. 7) and deemed necessary in a number of policy reports to eliminate
Latin America’s infrastructure gap with respect to East Asia. In addition, suppose that
through governance reforms public investment eﬃciency, as measured by , is increased in
all countries from 04 to the level of Brazil’s, as estimated by Dabla-Norris et al. (2012,
Table 1), that is, 078. The higher stock of public capital contributes to higher productivity
in both the final good and innovation sectors (with the latter also benefiting from increased
monitoring intensity), which improves the economy’s ability to absorb specialized labor. In
addition to significantly higher long-run growth (from 03 percentage points in Table 4
to 24 points) this program leads to an increase in specialized unemployment of only 11
percentage points (compared to 26 in Table 4). However, this combination of policies does
not solve the absorption problem.32 The broader lesson from this experiment is therefore
that, although investing in infrastructure and improving eﬃciency in public spending are
important to promote labor demand and growth, caution is also needed in promoting
higher education through reductions in training costs, to avoid creating an oversupply of
specialized workers. In many of these countries, improving the quality of education may
prove more eﬀective.
32Moreover, it is an open question as to whether, in practice, a program involving a permanent increase
in the ratio of investment to GDP to more than 6 percent is sustainable politically.
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7.3 Policy Externalities
Finally, a question worth asking is to what extent composite reform programs generate long-
run gains that exceed those generated by independent policies. This issue can be addressed
in a simple manner by adding up the steady-state results for each individual policy in
a composite program with respect to a particular set of variables, and comparing the
aggregate numbers with those reported in Table 4 for the relevant program. The diﬀerence
between the latter and the sum of individual eﬀects gives a measure of interactions between
reforms and (depending on its sign) whether they complement or oﬀset each other, that is,
whether policy externalities are positive or negative.
For Program C for instance, the sum of partial eﬀects gives a total of 00029 for the
growth rate (compared to 00031 in Table 4), −00509 for the aggregate unemployment rate
(compared to −00373), and −01259 for social welfare (compared to −01207). Whether
externalities are positive or negative the benefits of comprehensive programs depends there-
fore on which outcomes one chooses to focus on; in terms of growth, integrated programs
perform better because they generate positive externalities. In terms of unemployment
or welfare, however, they perform worse.33 Intuitively, policies aimed at cutting unem-
ployment benefits and diluting union’s ability to impose excessive wages for untrained
workers tend to be associated with drops in wages and consumption for the unemployed
and untrained groups–despite the fact that they are complementary to other policies in
promoting innovation and specialized employment. Similarly, while combining skills expan-
sion policies (cuts in training cost) with conventional labor market policies tends to create
positive externalities in terms of growth and talent allocation, these policies also produce
counteracting eﬀects on the specialized wage premium. Thus, instead of a complementarity
eﬀect, they generate a negative externality which contributes to weaker outcomes for the
composite program in terms of its impact on (untrained) unemployment and welfare.
8 Concluding Remarks
The main implications of this paper were summarized in the introduction and need not be
repeated here. We therefore conclude by pointing out that the model could be extended to
33Similar results hold for the other composite programs considered earlier. They are not reported here
to save space.
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account for other types of labor market distortions, such as state-contingent firing costs and
severance payments, deskilling of the labor force associated with unemployment, as well as
a positive eﬀect of a higher share of more educated workers on life expectancy and savings
(and thus on economic growth), and various other forms of active labor market policies
(see Almeida et al. (2012) and Duval and Furceri (2018)). In particular, hiring and firing
regulations, and hiring costs, have been shown to have an adverse eﬀect on unemployment,
especially when search and matching considerations are important;34 their implications for
growth and welfare, however, are less well understood.
A more systematic eﬀort to integrate political economy considerations in assessing the
performance of labor market reforms in growth models would also be warranted. Observers
have often argued that the costs of these reforms are incurred up front and concentrated
on specific groups, whereas their benefits materialize later and are both more diﬀuse and
less predictably allocated among workers and households. In addition, conflicting growth
and welfare eﬀects may well lead to organized resistance to reform. A key challenge then is
to create the political consensus needed to confront powerful vested interests and mitigate
dynamic trade-oﬀs between (short-term) costs and (longer-term) gains.
At the same time, if specific labor market reforms fail to produce broad benefits–
as suggested by some of our numerical experiments–political viability may well require
implementing reform programs that eschew them and focus instead on upfront measures
that matter more for productivity, including better access to infrastructure, which can also
help to promote innovation. Put diﬀerently, with limited political capital and little capacity
to compensate losers in the short run, pursuing a wide array of labor market reforms at
once may prove costly and ineﬀective. Moreover, even when there is broad support for
reform, weak administrative capacity and inadequate governance–key constraints in many
middle-income countries–militate in favor of a narrow reform agenda.
34See Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012) and Millán et al. (2014) for some supportive evidence. However,
other studies provide a mixed picture; see International Labour Oﬃce (2012) for a discussion.
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Table 1
Parameter Values: Benchmark Case
Parameter Description Value
Households
 Intergenerational discount rate 0:375
 Household savings rate 0:138
 Productivity parameter (e¢ ciency of training) 0:5
 Advanced education cost 0:12
" Time allocated to schooling activity 0:123
Final good
! Elasticity wrt public-private capital ratio 0:24
S Elasticity wrt specialized workers 0:35
U Elasticity wrt untrained workers 0:2
 Elasticity wrt private capital 0:35
 Elasticity wrt intermediate input 0:1
Intermediate goods
 Substitution parameter, intermediate goods 0:25
Innovation sector
R1 Elasticity wrt public infrastructure 0:300
 Probability of being caught shirking 0:048
R Elasticity wrt wage for innovation 0:9
 Elasticity of production wrt labor input 0:6
 Elasticity of e¤ort wrt relative wages 0:43
Government
 Tax rate on total wages 0:123
I Share of spending on infrastructure 0:069
' E¢ ciency parameter, public investment 0:4
Labor market
S Specialized labor, unemp. benet indexation 0:4
U Untrained labor, unemp. benet indexation 0:4
U Relative weight, untrained workers 0:08
SY Relative weight, specialized workers 0:08
wU0 Minimum wage indexation, untrained workers 0:546
wSY0 Minimum wage indexation, specialized workers 0:699
{U Elasticity wrt unemployment, untrained wage 0:12
{S Elasticity wrt unemployment, specialized wage 0:12
Table 2
Initial Steady-State Values of Key Variables
Variable Description Value
U Share of untrained workers in population 0:795
S Share of e¤ective specialized workers in population 0:184
SR Share of e¤ective specialized workers in innovation sector 0:004
SY Share of e¤ective specialized workers in nal good sector 0:109
UY Share of untrained workers in nal good sector 0:708
UL Untrained unemployment rate 0:087
SL Specialized unemployment rate 0:071
(R SR)=SY Index of misallocation of talent 0:392
SL Probability of specialized workers getting unemployed 0:385
SY Prob. of specialized workers employed in nal good sector 0:593
SR Prob. of specialized workers employed in innovation sector 0:022
UL Prob. of untrained workers getting unemployed 0:110
UY Prob. of untrained workers getting employed 0:890
& Firmspayroll contribution rate 0:052
wU=wSweighted Relative wage ratio 0:750
kG Public-private capital ratio 0:147
Y=KP Final output-private capital ratio 0:429
m Stock of innovation-private capital ratio 0:100
Table 3
Steady‐state
value Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of untrained workers  0.795 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001 0.001 0.002
Effective share of specialized workers 0.184 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.002
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Expected wage premium 0.333 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.004 ‐0.022 ‐0.016
Index of misallocation of talent 0.392 ‐0.001 ‐0.004 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 0.000
Untrained unemployment rate 0.087 ‐0.009 ‐0.020 0.000 ‐0.002 0.000 0.000
Specialized unemployment rate 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ‐0.001 ‐0.002
Total unemployment rate 0.079 ‐0.007 ‐0.015 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 0.000
Payroll contribution rate 0.052 ‐0.002 ‐0.007 ‐0.002 ‐0.004 ‐0.002 ‐0.003
Growth rate of final output 0.039 0.003 0.000 ‐0.002 0.000 ‐0.006 0.000
Social welfare 1.000 0.004 ‐0.076 ‐0.223
Steady‐state
value Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of untrained workers  0.795 0.001 0.002 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 0.001
Effective share of specialized workers 0.184 ‐0.001 ‐0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 ‐0.001
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Expected wage premium 0.333 ‐0.016 ‐0.012 0.002 0.006 ‐0.011 ‐0.008
Index of misallocation of talent 0.392 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.003 ‐0.012 ‐0.012
Untrained unemployment rate 0.087 0.000 ‐0.002 ‐0.006 ‐0.015 0.000 0.000
Specialized unemployment rate 0.071 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 0.000 0.000 ‐0.004 ‐0.004
Total unemployment rate 0.079 0.000 ‐0.001 ‐0.005 ‐0.011 ‐0.001 ‐0.001
Payroll contribution rate 0.052 ‐0.004 ‐0.007 ‐0.001 ‐0.005 ‐0.001 ‐0.002
Growth rate of final output 0.039 ‐0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.000
Social welfare 1.000 ‐0.280 0.003 ‐0.026
Steady‐state
value Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of untrained workers  0.795 ‐0.020 ‐0.050 0.000 0.000
Effective share of specialized workers 0.184 0.016 0.038 0.000 0.000
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Expected wage premium 0.333 ‐0.088 ‐0.182 0.003 0.002
Index of misallocation of talent 0.392 ‐0.014 ‐0.031 ‐0.005 ‐0.006
Untrained unemployment rate 0.087 ‐0.004 ‐0.023 0.000 0.000
Specialized unemployment rate 0.071 0.013 0.032 0.000 0.000
Total unemployment rate 0.079 ‐0.001 ‐0.009 0.000 0.000
Payroll contribution rate 0.052 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000
Growth rate of final output 0.039 0.004 0.002 0.050 0.001
Social welfare 1.000 0.058 ‐0.002
 */ The respective individual policy shocks are: Reduction in wU₀ by 5 percent; κU reduced by 10 percent; 
      κS reduced by 10 percent; both κU and κS cut by 10 percent; ξU reduced by 37.5 percent;  ξSY reduced by 37.5 percent;  
      a decrease in advanced education cost by 5 percent; 
      and an increase in share of public infrastructure investment by 20 percent.
 Source: Authors' calculations.
Summary of Benchmark Individual Policy Experiments*
Increase in Public 
Infrastructure Investment
Advanced Education          
Cost Cut   
Reduction in Base Minimum 
Wage
Reduction in Untrained 
Workers' UB Indexation
Reduction in Specialized 
Workers' UB Indexation
Reduction in Specialized 
Workers' Union Mark‐up   
Reduction in Untrained 
Workers' Union Mark‐up
Reduction in both UB 
Indexation Parameters    
[Absolute deviations from baseline]
Steady‐state
value Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of untrained workers  0.795 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.021 ‐0.049 ‐0.021 ‐0.049
Effective share of specialized workers 0.184 0.001 0.002 0.016 0.038 0.016 0.038
Share of specialized workers in innovation 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
Expected wage premium 0.333 ‐0.005 0.010 ‐0.072 ‐0.158 ‐0.069 ‐0.156
Index of misallocation of talent 0.392 ‐0.004 ‐0.010 ‐0.026 ‐0.048 ‐0.032 ‐0.055
Untrained unemployment rate 0.087 ‐0.022 ‐0.049 ‐0.026 ‐0.060 ‐0.026 ‐0.060
Specialized unemployment rate 0.071 0.000 ‐0.001 0.010 0.026 0.009 0.026
Total unemployment rate 0.079 ‐0.017 ‐0.037 ‐0.017 ‐0.037 ‐0.018 ‐0.037
Payroll contribution rate 0.052 ‐0.007 ‐0.020 ‐0.006 ‐0.015 ‐0.006 ‐0.016
Growth rate of final output 0.039 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.058 0.003
Social welfare 1.000 ‐0.168 ‐0.120 ‐0.121
*/  Program A includes  a decrease in κS by 6.25 percent;  a decrease in κU by 6.25 percent; a decrease in wU0 by 10 percent; 
      and a reduction in untrained union mark‐up by 37.5 percent; 
      Program B includes a decrease in μ by 5 percent; an increase in advanced education period by 22 percent; a decrease in κS by 6.25 percent; 
      a decrease in κU by 6.25 percent; a decrease in wU₀ by 10 percent; and a reduction in untrained union mark‐up by 37.5 percent; 
      Program C adds an increase in public infrastructure investment by 20 percent to Program B.
 Source: Authors' calculations.
Program C   Program A    Program B   
Table 4
Summary of Benchmark Composite Reform Programs*
[Absolute deviations from baseline]
Final Good Sector Innovation Sector
S-type labor supplyU-type labor supply
Wage rate, S-type 
labor
Wage rates, U-type labor
S-type labor
Trade union
Minimum wage
Shirking
Detection risk
Figure 1
Production Structure and the Labor Market
Training decision
(Beginning of  adulthood)
Unemployment
Intermediate Good 
Sector
Training cost
Unemployment benefits
Mandated compensation
Highest abilities
Blueprints
Figure 2 
Individual and Composite Experiments
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
Source: Authors' calculation.
Impact effects Steady-state effects
Minimum wage cut
Untrained UB cut
Specialized UB cut
Untrained mark-up cut 
Specialized mark-up cut
Training cost cut
Program A
Program B
Program C
-0.04 -0.02 0.00
                        Total Unemployment Rate
Minimum wage cut
Untrained UB cut
Specialized UB cut
Untrained mark-up cut 
Specialized mark-up cut
Training cost cut
Program A
Program B
Program C
-0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07
                            Final Output Growth Rate
Minimum wage cut
Untrained UB cut
Specialized UB cut
Untrained mark-up cut 
Specialized mark-up cut
Training cost cut
Program A
Program B
Program C
-0.16 -0.08 0.00 0.08 0.16
                                   Social Welfare
Minimum wage cut
Untrained UB cut
Specialized UB cut
Untrained mark-up cut 
Specialized mark-up cut
Training cost cut
Program A
Program B
Program C
-0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
                       Index of Misallocation of Talent
